On Monday, some of the most visited websites in the world started handing malware to their own visitors — the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab and HSBC among them. Not because their own systems were broken into, but because of a few lines of code hidden inside a trusted third-party tool.
Security researcher Scott Helme and his team at Report URI found it. They checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets — code websites load to run A/B tests — and found 188 carrying malicious JavaScript, belonging to 178 organizations. Helme said the real number is probably higher.
The first infected snippet turned up at 04:21 UTC on Monday, in the BBC's code. By late evening, 187 of the 188 had been cleaned. Researchers call the attack OPTIMJACK.
Optimizely confirmed the incident in the early hours of Tuesday. In a status page entry posted at 01:02 UTC, the company said an unauthorized party had exploited a vulnerability in the signup flow for its Experimentation accounts to add malicious JavaScript to customer projects. It said it had fixed the flaw, removed the code and notified affected customers, but has not said how many projects were hit or published a full account of how the flaw was used.
What has rattled security teams is how ordinary the break-in was. Nobody hacked Optimizely's content delivery network. Every customer loads a snippet that includes a field called Project JavaScript, where the customer can write its own code. The attacker simply wrote code into that field, project after project, and the network served it exactly as instructed, from cdn.optimizely.com, under Optimizely's own certificate. Self-hosted snippets were hit too, and Smartsheet's was cleaned, then infected a second time.
The code was built to take money. It watched for cryptocurrency wallet addresses — Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Tron and others — and quietly replaced them with addresses the attacker controlled. A card skimmer added during the day watched form submissions for card numbers, expiry dates and security codes. It also stole cookies and screenshots, and on older iPhones and iPads it loaded exploit kits known as Coruna and DarkSword. Phones on iOS 18.7.3 or 26.3 or later are patched.
By 19:25 UTC on Monday, wallets linked to the campaign had received about $7,040 in cryptocurrency — though one of those wallets had been in use since March, so not all of it came from this attack. Nobody can yet say how many card numbers or cookies reached the attacker. Card details typed inside hosted payment frames, such as Stripe or Adyen, were out of its reach.
The companies caught up in it have responded in different ways. Zoom said it had disabled Optimizely across its production systems as a precaution and had found no impact on customer data at that time. Salesforce issued an advisory on Tuesday. Equifax told Reuters it had stopped using Optimizely and found no evidence its own systems were compromised; IKEA said it was assessing the impact. Reuters could not establish how many visitors were affected.
The numbers carry a second lesson. Only 24 of the affected organizations Report URI evaluated had security settings tight enough to block the code. Sixty-eight had no content security policy at all; fifty had one that let the code through. Trusting a vendor's domain is not the same as trusting who can write to it.
This was not the first wave. From November 13, the same actor pushed a similar loader through scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media. Optimizely was the biggest channel found so far. How one attacker got write access to so many unrelated projects is still unanswered. Optimizely has not explained it.



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